Christian B. Miller holds a B.A. in philosophy from Princeton University, and a Ph.D. from the University of Notre Dame. His main areas of research are meta-ethics, moral psychology, moral character, action theory, and philosophy of religion. He is the A. C. Reid Professor of Philosophy at Wake Forest University, and currently the Director of the Honesty Project (honestyproject.philosophy.wfu.edu/), funded by a $4.4 million grant from the John Templeton Foundation. In recent years he was the Philosophy Director of the Beacon Project (www.moralbeacons.org), funded by a $3.9 million grant from Templeton Religion Trust, and the Director of the Character Project (www.thecharacterproject.com), funded by $5.6 million in grants from the John Templeton Foundation and Templeton World Charity Foundation. He is the author of over 100 academic papers as well as Moral Psychology with Cambridge University Press (2021) and four books with Oxford University Press, Moral Character: An Empirical Theory (2013), Character and Moral Psychology (2014), The Character Gap: How Good Are We? (2017), and Honesty: The Philosophy and Psychology of a Neglected Virtue (2021). He is a science contributor for Forbes, and his writings have also appeared in The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Dallas Morning News, Slate, The Conversation, Newsweek, Aeon, and Christianity Today. Miller is the editor or co-editor of Essays in the Philosophy of Religion (OUP), Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology (OUP), Moral Psychology, Volume V: Virtue and Character (MIT Press), Integrity, Honesty, and Truth Seeking (OUP), and The Continuum Companion to Ethics (Continuum Press).

Please see my personal website.

5. Honesty: The Philosophy and Psychology of a Neglected Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

4. Moral Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. 75 pages. Available here.

3. The Character Gap: How Good Are We? New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 296 pages. Available here. Audio edition, September 2018. Chinese edition, 2019. Italian edition, 2020. Korean edition, 2021.

2. Character and Moral Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 288 pages. Available here.

1. Moral Character: An Empirical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 368 pages. Available here.

Edited Volumes

5. Integrity, Honesty, and Truth Seeking. Ed. Christian B. Miller and Ryan West. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. Available here.

4. Moral Psychology, Volume V: Virtue and Character. Ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Christian B. Miller. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017. Available here.

3. Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology. Ed. Christian Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela Knobel, and William Fleeson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. Available here.

2. The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Ed. Christian Miller. London: Continuum Press, 2011. 355 Pages. Available here. Paperback Edition: The Bloomsbury Companion to Ethics, 2014. Available here. Introduction published in translation in Iran in 2019.

1. Philip Quinn. Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. Ed. Christian Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 328 pages. Available here.

Edited Journal Special Issues

3. Symposium on New Work on Character. Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (2017): 621-760.

2. Symposium on New Developments in the Theology of Character. Studies in Christian Ethics 30 (2017): 260-328.

1. Symposium on Agency. Ethics 118 (2008): 385-463.

Papers on Character

102. TBD, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Special Issue on “Moral Psychology and the Goals of Moral Education,” in progress.

101. “Christians, Conspiracy Theories, and Character,” in Christianity and Conspiracy Theories. Eerdmans Publishing, in progress.

100. “Technology and the Virtue of Honesty,” in Technology Ethics: A Philosophical Introduction and Readings. Eds. Gregory J. Robson and Jonathan Y. Tsou. Routledge, in progress.

99. “Accountability, Autonomy, and Motivation.” Commentary for Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, forthcoming.

98. “Brady on Virtue and Suffering,” Book Symposium, The Journal of Value Inquiry, forthcoming.

97. “McPherson on Virtue and Meaning,” Book Symposium, Res Philosophica, forthcoming.

96. “The Philosophy and Psychology of Character,” Personality Science, forthcoming.

95. “Batson on Prosocial Motivation,” Motivation Science, forthcoming.

94. “Cultivating Virtue in the University: Some Ideas from Philosophy and Psychology,” in Cultivating Virtue in the University. Eds. Michael Lamb, Jonathan Brant, and Edward Brooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

93. “Cultivating Honesty,” in Faith & Virtue Formation: Christian Philosophy in Aid of Becoming Good, Eds. Adam Pelser and Scott Cleveland. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

92. “Flirting with Skepticism about Practical Wisdom.” Practical Wisdom: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Routledge, forthcoming.

91. “Moral Relativism and Virtue.” Virtues and Virtue Education in Theory and Practice: Are Virtues Local or Universal? Eds. Catherine A. Darnell and Kristján Kristjánsson. New York: Routledge, 2021, 11-25.

90. “Motivation and the Virtue of Honesty: Some Conceptual Requirements and Empirical Results.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Special Issue on Character. 23 (2020): 355-371.

89. “Honesty and Dishonesty: Unpacking Two Character Traits Neglected by Philosophers.” 75^th Anniversary Special Issue on Virtue Ethics: Contemporary Issues. Portuguese Journal of Philosophy 76 (2020): 343-362.

88. “The Virtue of Honesty, Nazis at the Door, and Huck Finn Cases.” Belgrade Philosophical Annual. Special Issue on Moral Psychology 32 (2019): 51-66.

87. “Précis of The Character Gap: How Good Are We?” and “Replies to Nancy E. Snow and Jennifer Cole Wright.” Authors-Meets-Critics Symposium on The Character Gap. Journal of Philosophical Research 44 (2019): 197-200, 225-235.

86. “Some Complexities of Categorizing Character Traits,” in Virtue Ethics: Retrospect and Prospect. Ed. Elisa Grimi. Springer,  2019, 81-98.

85. “Some Philosophical Concerns about How the VIA Classifies Character Traits and the VIA-IS Measures Them.” Journal of Positive Psychology 14 (2019): 6-19.

84. “Virtue Epistemology and Developing Intellectual Virtue,” (with Alan Wilson) in The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, Ed. Heather Battaly. New York: Routledge, 2018, 483-495.

83. “Generosity: A Preliminary Account of a Surprisingly Neglected Virtue.” Metaphilosophy. Special Issue on Connecting Virtues. 49 (2018): 216-245.

Reprinted in Connecting Virtues: Advances in Ethics, Epistemology, and Political Philosophy, Ed. Michel Croce and Maria Silvia Vaccarezza. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2018, 23-50.

82. “Virtue as a Trait,” in Oxford Handbook of Virtue. Ed. Nancy Snow. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018, 9-34.

81. “Wong on Three Confucian Metaphors for Ethical Development.” Dao 16 (2017): 551-558.

80. “How Contemporary Psychology Supports Central Elements of Simḥah Zissel’s Picture of Character.” Journal of Jewish Ethics 3 (2017): 120-130.

79. “Character and Situationism: New Directions.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Special Issue on New Directions in Character and Virtue. 20 (2017): 459-471.

78. “Honesty,” in Moral Psychology, Volume V: Virtue and Character. Ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Christian B. Miller. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017, 237-273.

77. “Honesty Revisited: More Conceptual and Empirical Reflections,” in Moral Psychology, Volume V: Virtue and Character. Ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Christian B. Miller. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017, 295-307.

76. “The Psychology of Virtue,” Handbook of Virtue Ethics in Business and Management. Ed. Alejo Sison. Springer, 2017, 491-500.

75. “Categorizing Character: Moving Beyond the Aristotelian Framework,” in Varieties of Virtue Ethics. Ed. David Carr. Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 143-162.

74. “On Kristjánsson on Aristotelian Character Education.” Journal of Moral Education 45 (2016): 490-501.

73. “A New Approach to Character Traits in Light of Psychology,” Questions of Character. Ed. Iskra Fileva. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, 249-267.

72. “The Moral Animal: Virtue, Vice, and Human Nature.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. Exchange with Heather Berlin and Michael Shermer (2016): 39-56.

71. “Virtue Cultivation in Light of Situationism,” in Developing the Virtues: Integrating Perspectives. Ed. Julia Annas, Darcia Narvaez, and Nancy Snow. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, 157-183.

70. “Should Christians be Worried about Situationist Claims in Psychology and Philosophy?” Faith and Philosophy 33 (2016): 48-73.

69.“Does the CAPS Model Improve Our Understanding of Personality and Character?” in From Personality to Virtue. Ed. Jonathan Webber and Alberto Masala. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 155-185.

68. “The Mixed Trait Model of Character Traits and the Moral Domains of Resource Distribution and Theft,” in Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology. Ed. Christian B. Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela Knobel, and William Fleeson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, 164-191.

67. “Some Foundational Questions about Character” (with Angela Knobel), in Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology. Ed. Christian B. Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela Knobel, and William Fleeson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, 19-40.

66. “Are Most of Us Honest People? Or Dishonest? Or Neither?” [Translated in Polish] in W poszukiwaniu moralnego charakteru. Ed. Artur Szutta and Natasza Szutta. Lublin: Academicon Publishing House, 2015, 103-145.

65. “Empathy as the Only Hope for the Virtue of Compassion and as Support for a Limited Unity of the Virtues.” Philosophy, Theology, and the Sciences. Special Issue on Empathy, Compassion, and Love (2015): 89-113.

64.“Russell on Acquiring Virtue,” in Current Controversies in Virtue Theory. Ed. Mark Alfano. New York: Routledge, 2015, 106-117.

63. “Lack of Virtue and Vice: Studies of Aggression and Their Implications for the Empirical Adequacy of Character.” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Volume 4. Ed. Mark Timmons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 80-112.

62. “The Real Challenge to Virtue Ethics from Psychology,” in The Philosophy and Psychology of Virtue. Ed. Nancy Snow and Franco Trivigno. New York: Routledge, 2014, 15-34.

61. “Moral Virtues, Epistemic Virtues, and the Big Five,” in Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Ed. Owen Flanagan and Abrol Fairweather. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, 92-117.

60. “The Problem of Character,” in The Handbook of Virtue Ethics. Ed. Stan van Hooft. Durham: Acumen Press, 2014, 418-429.

59. “Honesty, Cheating, and Character in College.” The Journal of College and Character. Special Issue on Moral Character. (2013): 213-222.

58. “Do People have the Virtues or Vices? Some Results from Psychology,” in Ethics and the Challenge of Secularism: Russian and Western Perspectives. Ed. David Bradshaw. Washington D.C.: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2013, 63-88.

Reprinted in Russian translation in Eticheskaya Mysl (Ethical Thought). Ed. Abdusalam Guseynov. Moscow: Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Issue 13, 2013, 212-245.

57. “The Challenge to Virtue, Character, and Forgiveness from Psychology and Philosophy.” Symposium on Forgiveness. Philosophia Christi 14 (2012): 125-143.

56. “Guilt, Embarrassment, and Global Character Traits Associated with Helping,” in New Waves in Ethics. Ed. Thom Brooks. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 150-187. This is an expanded version of “Guild and Helping.”

55. “Character Traits, Social Psychology, and Impediments to Helping Behavior.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (2010): 1-36.

54. “Guilt and Helping,” in Advances in Psychology Research. Ed. Alexandra Columbus. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010, 117-138.

Reprinted in International Journal of Ethics 6:2/3 (2010):  231-252.

Reprinted in Perspectives on Ethics. Jeremy Duncan (ed.). New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2011.

53. “Social Psychology, Mood, and Helping: Mixed Results for Virtue Ethics.” The Journal of Ethics. Special Issue on Situationism. 13 (2009): 145-173.

52. “Empathy, Social Psychology, and Global Helping Traits.” Philosophical Studies 142 (2009): 247-275.

Reviewed in Philosopher’s Digest, http://www.philosophersdigest.com/.

51. “Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics.” The Journal of Ethics 7 (2003): 365-392.

Papers on Moral Psychology and Philosophy of Action

50. “Rationalism and Intuitionism,” in Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Ed. Mark Timmons, Karen Jones, and Aaron Zimmerman. New York: Routledge, 2019, 329-346.

49. “Situationism and Free Will,” in The Routledge Companion to Free Will. Ed. Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith, and Neil Levy. New York: Routledge, 2017, 407-422.

48. “Naturalism and Moral Psychology,” in Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Ed. Kelly Clark. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2016, 416-434.

47. “Assessing Two Competing Approaches to the Psychology of Moral Judgments.” Philosophical Explorations, 19 (2016): 28-47.

46. “Furlong and Santos on Desire and Choice,” in Moral Psychology: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Volume 4. Ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014, 367-374.

45. “Identifying with our Desires.” Theoria 79 (2013): 127-154.

44. “Defining Empathy: Thoughts on Coplan’s Approach.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy Spindel Volume 49 (2011): 66-72.

43. “Gert on Subjective Practical Rationality.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2008): 551-561.

42. “Motivational Internalism.” Philosophical Studies 139 (2008): 233-255.

41. “Motivation in Agents.” Noûs 42 (2008): 222-266.

40. “The Structure of Instrumental Practical Reasoning.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2007): 1-41.

39. “The Policy-Based Approach to Identification.” Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007): 105-125.

Papers on Meta-Ethics

38. “The Naturalistic Fallacy and Theological Ethics,” in The Naturalistic Fallacy. Ed. Neil Sinclair. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, 206-225.

37. “Moral Realism and Anti-Realism,” in The History of Evil. Volume Six. Ed. Jerome Gellman. Acumen Press, forthcoming 2018.

36. “What Should Theists Say about Constructivist Positions in Metaethics?” in Constructivism and Religious Ethics. Ed. Kevin Jung. New York: Routledge, 2018, 82-103.

35. “Theism and Morality,” in Philosophy for Us. Ed. Lenny Clapp. Cognella Academic, 2017, 113-123.

34. “Morality is Real, Objective, and Supernatural.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (2016): 74-82.

33. “On Shermer on Morality.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (2016): 63-68.

32. “In Defense of a Supernatural Foundation to Morality: Reply to Shermer.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (2016): 91-96.

31. “Overview of Contemporary Metaethics and Normative Theory,” in The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Ed. Christian Miller. London: Continuum Press, 2011, xiv-lii. Translated into Arabic and published as a standalone book in Iran by Seyyed Mohsen Eslami (2019).

30. “Moral Relativism and Moral Psychology,” in The Blackwell Companion to Relativism. Ed. Steven Hales. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2011, 346-367.

29. “The Conditions of Moral Realism.” The Journal of Philosophical Research 34 (2009): 123-155.

28. “The Conditions of Realism.” The Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (2007): 95-132.

27. “Shafer-Landau and Moral Realism.” Social Theory and Practice 32 (2006): 311-331.

26. “Rorty and Tolerance.” Theoria: Special Issue on the Philosophy of Richard Rorty 101 (2003): 94-108.

25. “Rorty and Moral Relativism.” European Journal of Philosophy 10 (2002): 354-374.

Reprinted in Richard Rorty: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers’. Ed. James Tartaglia. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Papers on Philosophy of Religion

24. “Theological Voluntarism,” in Oxford Handbook of Meta-Ethics. Eds. David Copp and Connie Rosati. Oxford: Oxford University Press, in progress.

23. “Are We Better Off Without Religion? The Harms (and Benefits) of Religious Belief,” in A New Theist Response to the New Atheists. Ed. Joshua Rasmussen and Kevin Vallier. New York: Routledge, 2020, 103-118.

22. “Atheism and the Benefits of Theistic Belief.” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Volume 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 97-125. Finalist, 2010 Younger Scholars Prize.

21. “Divine Will Theory: Desires or Intentions?” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 185-207.

20. “Divine Desire Theory and Obligation,” in New Waves in Philosophy of Religion. Ed. Nagasawa and E. Wielenberg. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 105-124.

19. “Quinn’s Philosophy of Religion,” in Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 1-18.

18. “Defeaters and the Basicality of Theistic Belief,” in Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge: Papers in Epistemology. Eds. Ron Rood, Sabine Roeser, and René van Woudenberg. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2005, 147-176.

Introductions, Prefaces, Encyclopedia Entries, Commentaries, Etc.

18. “Divine Command Theory,” in Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion. Ed. Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, forthcoming 2020.

17. “Introduction to Integrity, Honesty, and Truth Seeking,” (with Ryan West) in Integrity, Honesty, and Truth-Seeking. Ed. Christian B. Miller and Ryan West. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020, xv-xl.

16. “Teaching a Summer Seminar: Reflections from Two Weeks on the Philosophy and Psychology of Character in the Summer of 2018.” American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy, 2018: 12-19.

15. “Preface,” Hume’s Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology. Eds. Rico Vitz and Philip Reed. New York: Routledge, 2018, x-xi.

14. “Introduction to Symposium on New Work on Character,” Journal of Moral Philosophy, 14 (2017): 621-622.

13. “Situationism,” in The Blackwell International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, forthcoming 2017.

12. “Introduction to ‘New Developments in the Theology of Character,’” (with Angela Knobel) Studies in Christian Ethics 30 (2017): 260-261.

11. “Introduction,” (with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong), in Moral Psychology, Volume V: Virtue and Character. Ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Christian B. Miller. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017, 1-9.

10. “Modern Moral Relativism,” in Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science. Ed. Todd Shackelford and Viviana Weekes-Shackelford. Springer, 2016. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_529-1.

9. “Empirical Approaches to Moral Character.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-character-empirical/. Updated version published in 2020.

8. “Cornell Realism,” “Humean Theory of Motivation,” “Response-Dependent,” “Situationism,” and “Trait” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Third Edition. Ed. Robert Audi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 216-217, 481, 929, 987-988, and 1072-1073.

7. “Introduction” (with R. Michael Furr, Angela Knobel, and William Fleeson), in Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology. Ed. Christian B. Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela Knobel, and William Fleeson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, 1-16.

6. “Distributive Justice and Empirical Moral Psychology.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-moral-psych/. Updated version published in 2020.

5. “A Satisfactory Definition of Posttraumatic Growth Still Remains Elusive.” Target Article Commentary. European Journal of Personality (2014): 344-346.

4. “The Euthyphro Dilemma,” in The Blackwell International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2013, 1-7.

3. “Integrity,” in The Blackwell International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2013, 1-11.

2. “Resources for the Fields of Metaethics and Normative Theory,” and “Selected Works in Contemporary Metaethics and Normative Theory,” in The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Ed. Christian Miller. London: Continuum Press, 2011, 293-316.

1. “Introduction to Agency Symposium.” Ethics 118 (2008): 385-387.

Reviews

13. Review of Mark Murphy’s God’s Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency & the Argument from Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Journal of Analytic Theology, forthcoming.

12. Review of Diane Jeske. The Evil Within: Why We Need Moral Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2019).

11. Review of David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls. God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2017).

10. Review of Kristján Kristjánsson. Virtues and Vices in Positive Psychology: A Philosophical Critique. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2014).

9. Review of Mark Murphy. God and Moral Law: On the Theistic Explanation of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. The Philosophical Quarterly 63 (2013):: 398-400.

8. Review of Moral Psychology. The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development. Volume III. Ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2009).

7. Review of Moral Psychology. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. Volume II. Ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2009).

6. Review of Gabriele Taylor. Deadly Vices. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. The Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (2007): 409-413.

5. Review of Joel Kupperman. Ethics and Qualities of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2007).

4. Review of Joshua Gert. Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2005).

3. Review of Alexander Miller. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83:2 (2005):279-281.

2. Review of William Casebeer. Natural Ethical Facts. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003. The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 532-534.

1. Review of Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Ed. S. Stroud and C. Tappolet. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. The Journal of Moral Philosophy 1:2 (2004): 242-245.

Fall 2021 – PHI 111, Problems of Philosophy and PHI 360, Ethics.